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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case is an appeal by 917 Lusk, LLC ("Lusk") from the decision by the Boise City 
Council ("City Council") approving a height exception so that Royal Boulevard Associates, LP 
("Royal") can build a multi-family apartment complex called the River Edge Apartments ("River 
Edge") to a height exceeding the zone. (R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, pp. BC-284 through BC-287.) The 
subject site is 1004 West Royal Boulevard in Boise which is situated on the Boise River to the 
east of Ann Morrison Park and to the west of the property owned by Lusk. (R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, 
p. BC-162.) Lusk brings this appeal pursuant to the Local Land Use Planning Act, Idaho Code 
§§ 67-6501 et seq. ("LLUPA") and the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, Idaho Code§ 67-
5201 et seq. ("IAPA"). 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
On February 6, 2012, the Planning and Zoning Commission ("P&Z") approved on its 
consent agenda a height exception for River Edge. The following week, P &Z voted to 
reconsider the application upon discovering that two members of the public associated with Lusk 
who wished to provide testimony had been outside the hearing chambers when the application 
was approved. 
On March 5, 2012, P&Z held a full hearing on the River Edge application, receiving 
testimony from City staff, the applicant team, and members of the public. (R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, 
pp. BC-112 through BC-128.) Thereafter, P&Z unanimously approved the River Edge height 
exception and adopted reasons for the decision and conditions of approval, including twelve site-
specific conditions. (R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, p. BC-128; pp. BC-106 through BC-111.) Lusk filed 
1 
an appeal of P&Z's decision to the City Council asserting that the P&Z decision failed to meet 
the requirements for a CUP. (R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, p. BC-80; pp. BC-82 through BC-89.) 
On April 17, 2012, the City Council upheld P&Z's approval of the River Edge height 
exception and denied Lusk's appeal. (R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, pp. BC-284 through BC-287.) In 
addition to adopting P&Z's Reason for Decision, the City Council added that the height 
exception was appropriate for the neighborhood for a number of reasons, including that the 
property's R-O zone is purposefully designed for high density multi-family projects and that the 
amount of provided parking was sufficient. (R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, p. BC-285.) The City Council 
also required, as a condition of its approval and because of River Edge's proximity to Boise State 
University, that Royal increase the number of bicycle parking spaces from 48 to 112. (R. p. 
000132, Ex. 1, Tr., 4/17/2012 Boise City Council Hearing, pp. 36, 39; R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, p. 
BC-285.) 
Upon appeal by Lusk to the District Court, on May 31, 2013, the Honorable Senior 
District Judge Kathryn A. Sticklen affirmed the City Council's decision approving the River 
Edge height exception. (R. pp. 000111-000126.) The District Court found Lusk's arguments 
about procedural violations of both the conditional use ordinance and due process rights to be in 
error. (R. pp. 000123-000124.) 
C. Statement of Facts 
The River Edge Apartments is a five-story, modem, state-of-the-art living environment 
oriented toward Boise State University students. (R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, p. BC-176.) Located 
within a quarter-mile of the university campus, the property is currently zoned Residential Office 
with a Design Review Overlay ("R-OD"). (R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, p. BC-284; BC-159, BC-161.) 
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Multi-family housing is an allowed use for this location. Boise City Code § 11-04-05.04, Table 
2.1: "Multiple Family Dwellings". While the Boise City Zoning Ordinance ("zoning ordinance") 
limits construction height to 35 feet, LLUP A and the City's zoning ordinance allow this use to 
exceed the height limit upon issuance of a conditional use permit (CUP). Boise City Code§ 11-
04-05.05, Table 2.2A: "Maximum Dwelling Units Per Acre"; Idaho Code§ 67-6512(f). Height 
exceptions for the R-O zone, like this project, are suitable since it would be very difficult to 
construct the mixed-use urban development contemplated by the R-O zone while maintaining a 
35-foot height limitation. 
As designed, River Edge with its 280 parking spaces complies with the City's established 
off-street parking requirements. Boise City Code § 11-10-01.01, Table 1: "Residential 
Categories: Multi-family/Condominium." Also as designed, the density of River Edge easily 
meets the density limits set forth in the City's zoning ordinance. Boise City Code§ 11-04-05.05, 
Table 2.2A: "Maximum Dwelling Units Per Acre." Essentially, but for the height exception, 
Royal is entitled to build River Edge without any review by P&Z nor any input from Lusk. 
At the public hearings, the parties associated with Lusk sought to persuade P&Z and City 
Council that River Edge was not compatible with and would adversely impact the surrounding 
neighborhood because of its height and different style of housing product. Both elements were 
used by Lusk in an attempt to bring the focus to the project's impact on parking. Royal 
countered by presenting extensive evidence that River Edge would not cause adverse impacts on 
its neighbors. 
The City's parking code, set forth in Title 11, Chapter 10, Boise City Code, establishes 
the off-street parking and loading standards for all use categories within the City. Since the 
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River Edge application was for a different height than what was allowed in the zone, not a 
different use, both the P&Z and the City Council chose to interpret the parking code as sufficient 
and reasonable to address any concerns about compatibility and adverse impacts. (R. p. 000132, 
Ex. 1, Tr., 4/17/2012 Boise City Council Hearing, pp. 36-38; R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, pp. BC-126 
through BC-128.) Without a clear nexus, height was only tangentially related to parking. By 
meeting the established parking standards and with the addition of more bicycle parking, the City 
Council determined River Edge did not adversely impact the neighborhood. It is with this valid 
interpretation of the City's own zoning ordinance that Lusk disagrees and pursues this appeal. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Whether attorney's fees should be awarded to the City. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The City requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117 for the reason 
that Lusk brought its Petition for Judicial Review in the District Court and thereafter pursued the 
action in this Court without a reasonable basis in fact or law. The City's claim is set forth in 
Section V., beginning on page 15. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
Lusk has devoted the majority of its argument to alternative theories of procedural error, 
asserting that the City Council's approval of the River Edge height exception: failed to follow 
proper conditional use permit procedure; failed to consider enough parking information and the 
parking standards; failed to consider the neighbors' parking concerns; and failed to provide a 
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reasoned decision that meets the requirements ofldaho Code § 67-6535. Also, Lusk asserts that 
the procedural errors amount to prejudice to substantial rights. These claims are addressed in 
more detail below. 
B. Standard of Review 
LLUP A allows judicial review of a final decision of a land use application for an affected 
person, as provided in the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA). Idaho Code § 67-
6521(1)(d); In re Jerome County Bd. of Com 'rs, 153 Idaho 298, 307, 281 P.3d 1076, 1085 
(2012). The issuance of special or conditional use permits is allowed by Idaho Code§ 67-6512 
and includes exceptions or waivers of standards for building height as addressed by Idaho Code 
§ 67-6516. 1 Therefore, a party aggrieved by a decision of the City Council approving a 
conditional use permit for a height exception may seek judicial review under the provisions of 
IAPA. 
In an appeal from a district court decision in which the district court was acting in its 
appellate capacity under the IAP A, the Supreme Court reviews the agency record independently 
of the district court's decision. In re Jerome County, 153 Idaho at 307, 281 P.3d at 1085. As to 
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, the Court shall not substitute its judgment for 
that of the zoning agency. Idaho Code§ 67-5279(1). "The Court defers to the agency's findings 
of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and the agency's factual determinations are binding on 
1 Idaho Code § 67-6512 (f) provides: 
In addition to other processes permitted by this chapter, exceptions or waivers of 
standards, other than use, inclusive of the subject matter addressed by section 67-
6516, Idaho Code, in a zoning ordinance may be permitted through issuance of a 
special use permit or by administrative process specified by ordinance, subject to 
such conditions as may be imposed pursuant to a local ordinance drafted to 
implement subsection ( d) of this section. 
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the reviewing court, even when there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the 
determinations are supported by evidence on the record." Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. 
Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 126, 176 P.3d 126, 131 (2007). "There is a strong presumption 
favoring the validity of a governing board's zoning decisions, including its application and 
interpretation of its own zoning ordinance." Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 
Idaho 203,209, 159 P.3d 840, 845-846 (2007); see also, In re Jerome County, 153 Idaho at 308. 
C. Lusk Fails to Prove Any Prejudice to Substantial Rights 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(4) requires that the agency action "be affirmed unless substantial 
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." On a number of occasions, this Court has noted 
there is no IAPA requirement that courts address the requirements ofldaho Code§ 67-5279(3) 
and Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4) in any particular order. See, Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd. of 
Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 232, 254 P.3d 1224, 1228 (2011); Krempasky v. Nez Perce County 
Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231, 235-236, 245 P.3d 983, 987-988 (2010); Kirk-Hughes 
Dev., LLC v. Kootenai County Bd. of County Com 'rs, 149 Idaho 555, 557-558, 237 P.3d 652, 
654-655 (2010). Therefore, this Court can affirm the City Council's decision solely on the 
grounds that Lusk has failed to prove prejudice to substantial rights. Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 232. 
The Court may completely "forego analyzing whether the governing board erred in a manner 
specified by Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) if the petitioner cannot show that his or her substantial 
rights were violated." Id. The City believes the issue of substantial rights is dispositive and will 
address it first. 
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1. The City Council adopted a reasoned decision that meets the requirements of 
Idaho Code § 67-6535 and abides by this Court's ruling in Jasso v. Camas 
County. 
This Court has affirmed that "all the parties involved in a land-use decision have a 
substantial right to a reasonably fair decision-making process" that is "free from procedural 
defects that might reasonably have affected the final outcome." Id. In addition to notice and the 
opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker, "[ d]ue process also requires that 
parties be afforded a meaningful opportunity for judicial review." Jasso v. Camas County, 151 
Idaho 790, 796, 264 P .3d 897, 903 (2011 ). This is accomplished with the adoption of a reasoned 
statement in conformance with Idaho Code§ 67-6535. Id. 
Lusk does not allege improper notice or a failure to present evidence. Certainly, the 
agency record is clear there was adequate notice and fair hearings wherein P&Z and City 
Council received substantial amounts of evidence about River Edge from the parties associated 
with Lusk. (R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, Tr. 4/17/2012 Boise City Council Hearing, pp. 2-11, 26-31, 33-
34; R. p. 000132, pp. BC-81 through BC-95, BC-120 through BC-124, BC-224 through BC-225, 
BC-228 through BC-231, BC-239 through BC-261.) The impact of that evidence is highlighted 
by the fact the City Council took active steps to require River Edge to increase the number of 
bicycle parking spaces. (R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, Tr. 4/17/2012 Boise City Council Hearing, pp. 36-
37, 39; R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, p. BC-285.) 
Rather, Lusk claims that the City Council's Reason for Decision "fails to meet the basic 
requirements of a reasoned written statement required by LLUPA." (R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, p. BC-
284-85; Appellant's Br., p. 27.) In order to satisfy the "reasoned statement" requirement of 
Idaho Code § 67-6535, the decision-maker must articulate in writing the facts found, the 
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conclusions reached, and the rationale underlying the decision. Jasso v. Camas County, 151 
Idaho 790,794,264 P.3d 897, 901 (2011). 
Idaho Code§ 67-6535 provides: 
The approval or denial of any application required or authorized pursuant to this 
chapter shall be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains 
the criteria and standards considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts 
relied upon, and explains the rationale for the decision based on the applicable 
provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and statutory 
provisions, pertinent constitutional principles and factual information contained in 
the record. 
Idaho Code§ 67-6535(2). 
Lusk relies on Jasso v. Camas County to elevate its simple displeasure in the City 
Council's decision into prejudice to substantial rights - but this reliance is flawed. In Jasso, this 
Court found there was "utter failure" on the part of the Camas County Board of Commissioners 
to provide a decision that could facilitate judicial review. Jasso, 151 Idaho at 797. "Due to the 
inadequacy of the Board's findings and conclusions, neither the district court nor this Court 
possesses the information necessary to meaningfully review the Board's approval of the 
preliminary plat application." Id. In that failure, this Court found prejudice to the parties' 
substantial right to due process. Id. The same cannot be said for the situation at hand. 
A review of the agency record reveals that the City Council adopted a reasoned statement 
that meets the standard set forth in Idaho Code§ 67-6535 as explained by Jasso. At a minimum, 
the City Council could have simply adopted P&Z's "Reason for the Decision" to conform to 
Idaho Code§ 67-6535. (R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, pp. BC-108 through BC-111; Cowan v. Board of 
Com'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 511, 148 P.3d 1247, 1257 (2006)). But the City 
Council went further with its own reasoned statement, articulating its own rationale based on 
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relevant law and facts as required by Idaho Code § 67-6535. After review of the record and 
consideration of extensive testimony about parking standards and parking concerns, the City 
Council did formally adopt its Reason for Decision that clearly articulates acceptance of the 
original findings adopted by the P&Z and which adopts additional language as a result of the 
City Council hearing. (R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, pp. BC-121 through BC-122, BC-114 through BC-
115, BC-125, BC-284; BC-285 [top of page, "New Language from City Council"; R. p. 000132, 
Ex. 1, Tr., 4/17/2012 Boise City Council Hearing, pp. 6-11, 17-19, 21-23, 25, 27, 29-34.) In 
total, the Reason for Decision expresses the elements the City Council considered, the facts 
measured as important, and the zoning ordinance standards used and interpreted. Furthermore, 
the City Council added thirteen (13) site-specific and ten (10) standard Conditions of Approval 
deemed necessary and appropriate for the River Edge CUP - clear evidence of the City 
Council's thoughtful consideration of River Edge. (R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, pp. BC-285 through 
BC-287.) 
In sum, the City Council's action satisfied both Idaho Code § 67-6535 (2) and the 
reasoning of Jasso. The City Council's Reason for Decision is sufficient, "because it included 
the criteria and standards [the City Council] considered relevant, provided detailed facts, and 
explained its rationale for its decision." Cowan, 143 Idaho at 512, 148 P.3d at 1258. This Court, 
in tum, is "directed to consider the proceedings as a whole and to evaluate the adequacy of 
procedures and resultant decisions in light of practical considerations with an emphasis on 
fundamental fairness and the essentials ofreasoned decision-making." Idaho Code§ 67-6535(3). 
The City Council's reasoned statement was comprehensive and complete- and, despite efforts to 
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persuade this Court to the contrary, Lusk's claims of prejudice to substantial rights based on an 
insufficient reasoned statement are erroneous. (Appellant's Br., pp. 26-28.) 
2. As the non-applicant appellant, Lusk has failed to prove prejudice to 
substantial rights. 
Since the City Council's actions for River Edge satisfy the due process requirements of 
notice, an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker, and a reasonable 
opportunity for judicial review, non-applicant appellant Lusk must "show something more in 
order to prove prejudice of a substantial right under Idaho Code § 67-5279(4). Lusk limits its 
argument to the assertion that "due process and a procedurally fair decision are substantial rights 
of even a non-applicant petitioner." (Appellant's Br., p. 24.) This assertion completely 
misinterprets and disregards the significant distinctions articulated in this Court's decision in 
Hawkins v. Bonneville County Board of Commissioners, 151 Idaho 228,254 P.3d 1224 (2011). 
The decision in Hawkins makes it clear there is a difference between the permit applicant 
and the non-applicant opponent on the subject of substantial rights, pointing out that the 
non-applicant opponent cannot claim harm to a substantial right merely in the substantive 
misapplication of an ordinance: 
[W]hen a petitioner opposes a governing board's decision to grant a permit 
authorizing development, as Hawkins has, the petitioner must still show, not 
merely allege, real or potential prejudice to his or her substantial rights. Since a 
party opposing a landowner's request for a development permit has no substantial 
right in seeing someone else's application adjudicated correctly, he or she must 
therefore show something more. The petitioner opposing a permit must be in 
jeopardy of suffering substantial harm if the project goes forward, such as a 
reduction in the opponent's land value or interference with his or her use or 
ownership of the land. It would be instructive to look to law relating to property 
rights, nuisance, and trespass when determining if a substantial right is at stake in 
a case such as this. 
Thus, ( ... ) it is not enough that Hawkins may be able to show that the County 
substantively misapplied its own ordinance. The Board does not prejudice 
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Hawkins' substantial rights merely by incorrectly adjudicating someone else's 
application for a variance. (internal citations omitted) 
Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 233. 
Lusk, as the non-applicant opponent in the case at hand, cannot claim harm to a 
substantial right by merely asserting that the City Council failed to condition the River Edge 
height exception on each standard contained in Boise City Code§ 11-06-04.14. (Appellant's Br., 
p. 25.) Hawkins is clear Lusk has no such right to seeing Royal's application adjudicated 
correctly.2 
In the time since Hawkins, the Idaho Court of Appeals has provided a helpful 
interpretation that a court's review of harm to substantial rights under Idaho Code § 67-5279( 4) 
must involve consideration of the dual components of prejudice and standing. State Transp. 
Dept. v. Kalani-Keegan, 155 Idaho 297, 311 P.3d 309, 314-15 (Ct. App. 2013) ("The 
Hawkins Court references and requires, as to opposing or interested parties such as Hawkins who 
was a neighbor to the property but not an applicant, demonstration of both the materiality of the 
harm and the existence of a substantial right.") The right to notice and a chance to participate is 
the standing component or "the materiality of the harm" - the City does not dispute Lusk has 
standing. Kalani-Keegan, 311 P .3d at 314. As the District Court noted, Lusk was entitled to 
2 The City asserts the P&Z was never required, by the plain language of the ordinance, to 
condition the River Edge CUP on Boise City Code § 11-06-04.14. This is especially true in light 
of the parking standards set forth in Boise City Code § 11-10-01.01, Table 1, which were 
applicable to and met by Royal. If the language of an ordinance is unambiguous (where 
reasonable minds do not differ nor are uncertain as to its meaning), an ordinance is given its 
plain meaning. See, Jasso v. Camas County, 151 Idaho 790,798,264 P.3d 897, 905 (2011). 
If the P&Z had been required to condition the CUP on Boise City Code § 11-06-04.14, 
following Lusk's logic, the CUP would have been required to have conditions related to, for 
example, noise and vibration (see, § 11-06-04.14(D)) and hours of operation (see, § 11-06-
04.14(E)). 
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specific notice of Royal's height exception for River Edge due to proximity to the project. (R. p. 
000117.) Those "statutorily provided rights to notice and a chance to participate" is the standing 
component ofldaho Code§ 67-5279(4). Kalani-Keegan, 311 P.3d at 314. 
But Lusk fails to prove the second component: "the existence of a substantial right." Id. 
at 314-315. This is the "something more" that the Hawkins Court demanded of the non-applicant 
appellant. Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 233. If one assumes that the decision-making process was fair, 
the owner-applicant has "a substantial right to develop their own property." Id. In Hawkins, this 
Court proposed that a determination on the substantial rights of the non-applicant appellant could 
be made by looking to evidence about property rights, nuisance, or trespass. Id. At present, 
Lusk has provided only speculation and conjecture: "As a result, Lusk will suffer a loss in 
property value as well as the expenditure of considerable time and money policing parking on its 
own property." (Appellant's Br., p. 25.) The District Court confirmed that Lusk failed to make 
any specific argument about its own unique substantial rights. (R. p. 000124.) 
This Court should re-affirm its "something more" reasoning from Hawkins, affirm the 
Court of Appeal's explanation in Kalani-Keegan, and find that Lusk has provided nothing more 
than conclusory allegations of prejudice to imagined substantial rights. The extent of Lusk's 
affected property interests would be critical to determining prejudice to substantial rights, but 
those interests are not before the Court. See, Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 234. This case is not a civil 
action regarding property rights, it is a petition for judicial review under IAP A. Therefore, the 
only matter at issue is the propriety of granting a height exception to Royal to build River Edge 
as it is designed. Within these strict parameters, non-applicant appellant Lusk has failed to meet 
12 
its burden under Idaho Code § 67-5279(4) and, regardless of any other facts argued, this Court 
can affirm the City Council's decision and dismiss Lusk's appeal instantly. Id., at 232. 
D. The City Council did not commit error in its approval of the River Edge CUP. 
In addition to Lusk having to prove that its substantial rights were prejudiced m 
accordance with Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4), Lusk must prove that there was error in at least one of 
the standards of review set out in Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3) when the City Council affirmed the 
P&Z decision and approved the height exception for River Edge. 3 Lusk has failed to meet this 
burden. 
Because of the City's and Royal's indistinguishable interests in this case, and in the 
interests of brevity and ease of this Court's review, the City concurs with the arguments 
proffered by Royal concerning the standards of Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) and Lusk's failure to 
demonstrate error by the City Council. These arguments are set out in Royal's Brief and the City 
adopts them in their entirety, with the following additional comments. 
Lusk seeks to persuade this Court that the City Council failed to follow proper 
conditional use permit procedure, failed to consider enough parking information or the correct 
3 Idaho Code§ 67-5279 (3) requires: 
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by other 
provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless 
the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions 
are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
( d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
( e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and 
remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
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parking standards, and failed to consider the neighbors' parking concerns when it approved the 
River Edge CUP. The agency record, however, is filled with substantial evidence of the City 
Council's consideration of evidence and its coming to a reasoned decision that this Court cannot 
now second guess. (R. p. 000132, Ex. 1, Tr., 4/17/2012 Boise City Council Hearing, pp. 35-40; 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(1).) The City Council's performance of its duty as a quasi-judicial 
agency - by considering how specific facts align with the standards of the zoning ordinance - is 
now "binding on the reviewing court," even if there was conflicting evidence before the agency 
so long as the determinations are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Fischer v. 
City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 352, 109 P.3d 1091, 1094 (2005); Wohrle v. Kootenai County, 
147 Idaho 267,274,207 P.3d 998, 1005 (2009). Substantial and competent evidence is "relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Wohrle, 147 Idaho at 
274 (quoting Lamar Corp. v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 43,981 P.2d 1146, 1153 (1999)). 
Lusk's desire for a different outcome is apparent. With so much detail in the record 
about parking impacts, the City Council reviewed the evidence in a reasonable manner to reach 
its conclusions. Upon review, "[ t ]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency 
as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Idaho Code § 67-5279(1); see also, 
Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 209, 159 P.3d 840, 845 (2007). 
Furthermore, "[t]here is a strong presumption favoring the validity of a governing board's zoning 
decisions, including its application and interpretation of its own zoning ordinance." Marcia T. 
Turner, L.L. C., 144 Idaho at 209. 
Lusk has failed to meet the burdens imposed by Idaho Code § 67-5279. Therefore, this 
Court must affirm the City Council's decision approving the height exception for River Edge. 
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V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
A. Lusk is not entitled to attorney's fees. 
Lusk's demand for fees is not warranted. Attorney's fees can only be awarded pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 12-117 if: first, the Court finds in favor of a party; and second, the non-
prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Burns Holdings, LLC v. 
Madison County Bd. Of County Com 'rs, 147 Idaho 660, 664, 214 P.3d 646, 650 (2009). 
According to this Court, it is necessary "to determine whether there was no authority at all for 
the agency's actions." Wohrle, 147 Idaho at 276, 207 P.3d at 1007 (quoting Ralph Naylor 
Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 114 Idaho 806, 809, 172 P.3d 1081, 1084 (2007)). If an agency 
has no authority to take a particular action, it is said to act without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law. Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005). For the 
reasons argued herein, the City Council was not acting outside the scope of its authority when it 
approved the River Edge height exception. LLUPA, as well as the plain language of the City's 
zoning ordinance and parking standards, empowers the City Council to take the action it took. 
Therefore, Lusk should not be awarded attorney's fees in this matter. 
B. The City is entitled to attorney's fees. 
The arguments presented herein and those adopted from Royal's brief establish that the 
City is entitled to attorney's fees. The City requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 12-117 for the reason that Lusk has continued to insist, without basis in fact or law and 
for seemingly no other purpose than construction delay, that the City Council failed to properly 
adjudicate the River Edge CUP. The District Court's decision rightfully noted that the agency 
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record shows both the P &Z and the City Council considered the contentious parking issue and 
determined the project met the current code requirements without any need for further 
discussion. (R. p. 000123.) The City Council's formally adopted reason for decision with its 13 
site-specific conditions clearly is in accordance with Idaho Code § 67-6519(4) 4 and the 
controlling standards of the City's zoning ordinance. 
Lusk has failed to provide any rational legal argument for why this Court should overturn 
the City Council's decision under the applicable standards of review in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) 
and has provided no justification why their substantial rights as the non-applicant appellant have 
been prejudiced, as required by Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4). At the end of the day, this case boils 
down to the fact that on April 17, 2012, the City Council properly decided that the River Edge 
height exception was appropriate based on the City's own zoning ordinance and extensive 
testimony in the record. Lusk is dissatisfied with that decision, but dissatisfaction forms no basis 
for reversal and remand. This Court should uphold the City Council decision because of Lusk's 
failures as outlined herein and the Court's deference to the City Council's interpretation of its 
own laws. See, Marcia T Turner, L.L. C., 144 Idaho at 209. 
"The purpose of Idaho Code § 12-117 is to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary 
action and to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial 
burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies should 
never have made." Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork, 145 Idaho at 143, 176 P.3d at 138. 
Lusk's appeal is groundless and has served no other purpose than to delay desired multi-family 
4 Idaho Code§ 67-6519(4): "Whenever a governing board ... grants or denies an application, it 
shall specify: (a) The ordinance and standard used in evaluating the application; (b) The reasons 
for approval or denial; and ( c) The actions, if any, that the applicant could take to obtain 
approval." 
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development and burden the City with defense of its lawful planning and zoning actions. 
Accordingly, the City is entitled to be reimbursed for its reasonable attorney fees incurred in this 
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above arguments and those expressed in Royal's brief which the City has 
adopted, the City respectfully requests this Court's order affirming the April 17, 2012, decision 
by the City Council granting the River Edge height exception and its order affirming attorney's 
fees for the City for fees incurred in this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of November 2013. 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
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